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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past five to six years, counterinsurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan have reshaped U.S. military strategy, national security
t James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer
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activities in counterinsurgency operations for military and civilian personnel being
deployed to Afghanistan at the Camp Atterbury-Muscatatuck Center for Complex
Operations in Indiana and at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C.
He has taught Counterinsurgency and Rule of Law Operations and Complex
Operations and the Rule of Law at the Maurer School of Law
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thinking, and foreign policy.' Historically, such rapid shifts in U.S.
political and military strategies concerned with armed conflict have
occurred only in connection with developments in military
technologies, such as air power and nuclear weapons. By contrast,
the embrace of counterinsurgency (COIN) has no roots in
technological innovations that threaten U.S. military power or the
American way of life. In this sense, the rise of COIN in U.S.
political and military policies is an extraordinary development in
U.S. thinking about armed conflict.
Despite the dangers inherent in commenting on seminal
events still unfolding, this essay explores the U.S. relationship with
COIN thinking and strategy. The essay's purpose is not to argue, as
many have done, that the U.S. experience with COIN in Iraq and
Afghanistan demonstrates how challenging, complex, and
contentious COIN is.3  Fighting insurgencies has long proved
difficult for many countries, with few examples of counterinsurgent
forces achieving unequivocal success. Rather, this essay analyzes
why COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan has been so difficult for the
United States.
My argument is that American exceptionalism has played a
significant role in preventing the United States from meeting the
1. In this period, literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) has poured forth
in attempts to help or critique COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among
this literature, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual crafted by the U.S. Army and
Marine Corps stands out as a seminal analysis and prescriptive guide. See generally
U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (U.S. Army Field
Manual No. 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5) (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD
MANUAL].
2. John A. Nagl, who participated in the drafting of the COUNTERINSURGENCY
FIELD MANUAL captured the extraordinary nature of the shift into COIN when he
observed that "[p]erhaps no doctrinal manual in the history of the Army has been
so eagerly anticipated and so well received as Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency."
John A. Nagl, "Foreword: The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency," in COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra
note 1, at xiii, xvii. For many of my students, the importance of counterinsurgency
became more vivid when Nagl appeared on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart in
August 2007 to talk about COIN and the COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL,
surely a first for a military doctrine of any kind. See Interview by Jon Stewart of The
Daily Show with Lt. Col. John Nagl (Aug. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-august-23-2007/1t-col-john-nagl.
3. T. E. Lawrence-Lawrence of Arabia-famously captured the difficulties
of COIN when he said that "to make war on rebellion is messy and slow, like eating
soup with a knife." T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt, ARMY Q. & DEF.J., Oct.
1920, reprinted in COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE REPRINT 8 (1989), available at
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/lawrence.pdf.
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exceptional challenges posed by COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. As
a unique political and military activity, COIN does not connect with
the traits often identified as making the United States an
exceptional power politically and militarily. These difficulties do
not flow only from problems at the operational level, although such
problems have been epidemic in U.S. policies in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Instead, the difficulties emerge from deeper sources
within the American approach to national security and foreign
policy, specifically how the United States fuses its principles with
the exercise of its material power in connection with armed
conflict.
American exceptionalism is, at its core, a claim about the way
in which the United States utilizes its significant power in world
affairs in accordance with principles that define the United States
as a different player in international politics. In fighting
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has not
been able to align its principles and power in a manner that reflects
the claim of American exceptionalism. More deeply, the features
of American exceptionalism have contributed to the difficulties
faced by the United States in waging COIN in those two countries.
In short, American exceptionalism has been one of the obstacles to
the United States meeting the exceptional challenges posed by
COIN.4 Beneath the policy, tactical, and strategic problems that
have bedeviled U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN has
presented the United States with a much deeper political and
military challenge that carries implications for the future of U.S.
national security and foreign policy that the country has yet fully to
comprehend.
II. COIN EXCEPTIONALISM
As the literature on COIN over the past five years
demonstrates, most experts agree that engaging in COIN
represents an extremely difficult task that requires extraordinary
things from both the civilian and military agencies of involved
governments. Even the well-known description of COIN as the
"graduate level of war"5 does not adequately capture the taxing
4. Other attempts to link COIN with American exceptionalism have argued
that American exceptionalism produced or contributed to failed COIN efforts.
See, e.g., D. MICHAEL SHAFER, DEADLY PARADIGMS: THE FAILURE OF U.S.
COUNTERINSURGENCYPOLICY (1988).
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
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nature of fighting insurgencies effectively. The accepted premises
of COIN strategy call for civilian and military personnel to engage
in activities for which they have not been traditionally trained or
equipped to undertake. Members of armed forces are not typically
trained to engage in "armed social work."' Furthermore, diplomats
and development practitioners-whose goal is to facilitate rapid
nation-building activities in another country-are not accustomed
to participating in expeditionary missions that involve intense
political-military coordination in conditions of significant
insecurity.
COIN has been difficult for a long time, which demonstrates
that the exceptional nature of this type of armed conflict is not
epiphenomenal or uniquely associated with the troubles of the
United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. British, Ottoman, French,
Chinese, African, American, Soviet, and Indian governments have
all experienced failure in attempting to defeat insurgency
movements considered a threat to national security. These failures
span different historical periods, governmental regime types, and
political ideologies, suggesting that the difficulty of COIN is deeply
rooted in the nature of this kind of armed conflict.
This difficulty stands out even against the well-understood
complexities of armed conflict-the "fog of war" and all that.
Although war is the continuation of politics by violent means, the
historical trajectory of thinking about armed conflict has been to
advance the increased separation and specialization of civilian and
military components of such politics. This trajectory is especially
prevalent with the great powers, particularly the United States.
Developments in military technologies have contributed to this
separation, as the need for ever more specialized skills at deploying
more destructive weapons increased as part of the competition for
power and survival in the international system. The United States is
particularly associated with this embrace of military technology, as
the "American way of war" has been described as being one
dominated by the development of advanced military technologies
applied on a large scale to overwhelm adversaries or to deter them
from aggression.
6. See David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles-Fundamentals of Company-Level
Counterinsurgency 8 (Mar. 2006), http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents
/28articles.pdf (defining counterinsurgency as "armed social work").
7. See, e.g., RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY (1973).
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The trajectory of increased separation of military and civilian
components with respect to armed conflict also reflects two other
phenomena. First, since the latter half of the nineteenth century,
states and nongovernmental organizations (e.g., International
Committee of the Red Cross) have worked to protect, as much as
possible, the civilian population from armed conflict through
international humanitarian law. This law recognizes the reality of
military violence but seeks to direct such violence away from
civilian populations and the physical infrastructure that supports
the health and welfare of civilians. This strategy works to separate
the military and civilian realms during armed conflict and to have
military forces direct hostilities only at each other. This trend
connected with, and contributed to, the military's need for more
powerful, sophisticated technologies to deter or defeat rival military
forces.
Second, political efforts have been made to subordinate
military power to civilian control, especially through the spread of
democratic political philosophy and institutions. The objective is
to minimize military involvement in the political affairs of a nation
and to focus military capabilities on protecting the country from
external threats. This direction encourages the development of
separate civilian and military realms and responsibilities, and, in
particular, sets the military down a path of specializing in the
application of military technologies in armed conflict. These
efforts have contributed to the development of distance between
civilian and military responsibilities, thinking, cultures, and
capabilities. In the United States, these trends informed a linear
dynamic between civilian and military roles in armed conflict-the
civilians determined when armed conflict would begin and end,
but the conduct of the conflict itself was the military's domain.
This linear pattern is apparent in conventional U.S. military
doctrine's division of a military campaign into four phases, with the
fourth phase being military support to the post-conflict transition
back to the political realm.
As reflected in the U.S. search for guidance in its fight against
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN theory and doctrine
point counterinsurgents in a different direction-towards intense
strategic and tactical integration of civilian and military policies
and capabilities in coordinated political-military campaigns aimed
at shoring up an allied or friendly government facing violent
overthrow. Rather than minimizing the impact of military
52552011]
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operations on the civilian population for humanitarian reasons,
COIN requires making the political allegiance of that population
the primary strategic objective of all civilian and military activities.
With this objective, subordinating military activities to civilian
control becomes more difficult in these situations because all
military actions, down to the tactical level traditionally the domain
of military officers, have heightened political significance in COIN
campaigns. The traditional line demarcating the operational
primacy of the diplomat and the soldier blur. Harnessing the
military for COIN's more complicated political ends suffers when
the material capabilities of military forces have not been built for
these purposes, yet these capabilities far exceed what civilian
agencies can deploy-a capability gap produced by the historical
trend of ever deeper separation of civilian and military roles in
foreign policy and larger-scale investments in military than in
civilian capacities. This gap has been particularly glaring for the
United States because civilian agencies, such as the Department of
State and U.S. Agency for International Development, simply had
little to no expeditionary capabilities to deploy in Iraq or
Afghanistan when those COIN campaigns got underway.
COIN blurs the line between civilian and soldier in other
contexts as well. One controversy to emerge from COIN
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involves complaints from the
nongovernmental humanitarian assistance and development
communities that COIN's comprehensive, tightly-wound political-
military objectives diminish or eliminate the "humanitarian space"
these communities need to deliver aid to populations affected by
war. The modus operandi for humanitarian assistance and
development organizations in conflict settings embraces
neutrality-they provide their aid without taking sides in the
conflict or its resolution.
With COIN, humanitarian and development assistance is,
strategically and tactically, part of winning hearts and minds among
the civilian population. Civilian and military counterinsurgents
begin to occupy this space intentionally through programs and
projects designed to encourage targeted populations to take sides
in the conflict. Thus, in U.S. COIN thinking, nongovernmental
humanitarian and development groups became force multipliers
for counterinsurgents and delivery of money for humanitarian and
development purposes became a weapons system in the struggle
with the insurgency.
5256 [Vol. 37:5
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COIN is also exceptional in its operational demands on civilian
agencies and military forces. In conventional armed conflict,
military forces engage in combat in order to establish the terms of
an eventual political solution to the underlying problems that
produced war. Such combat requires acumen in military strategy,
tactics, logistics, and leadership and-with the exception of small
cadres of special forces-has not traditionally mandated extensive
knowledge of foreign languages, cultures, religions, and political
systems among military personnel. The need for such knowledge
relates more to the tasks of diplomacy, intelligence, and
development-with diplomacy and development valued more
before and after armed conflict than in the midst of hostilities with
enemy military forces.
However, as the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
illustrate, COIN's demand for language, cultural, and comparative
politics expertise among civilian and military personnel is
voracious, outstripping the capabilities developed in these areas by
the U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, development, and military corps
and by private contractors bidding for government contracts.
Further, the language, cultural, and comparative political skills the
governmental corps have traditionally developed were crafted for
different missions that reflect distinct bureaucratic cultures that,
over time, have become less, rather than more, alike. One example
is the concern among development experts in the U.S. government
over the COIN-influenced militarization of development as part of
the increased use of development activities to advance short-term
U.S. political interests, as opposed to pursuing development as a
long-term humanitarian endeavor.
The operational demands of COIN also require civilian and
military personnel to alter significantly their traditional approaches
to their responsibilities. On the military side, COIN doctrine
instructs combat units to minimize the use of force in order to
curtail harm to civilian populations rather than to find the most
rapid and efficient way to attack and defeat the enemy's military
capabilities. The need to minimize the use of force renders some
key military technologies, such as artillery and air power, and
technology-dependent tactics (e.g., calling in air support during a
firefight) suspect in COIN campaigns. The controversies that
emerged in Afghanistan concerning civilian deaths and injuries
caused by the use of U.S. air power highlight this reality. The need
to reduce the use of force often requires military forces to accept
2011] 5257
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greater risk when on patrol or in engagements with insurgents,
which cuts against the ethos of maximizing force protection among
military units.
Diplomats thrust into COIN contexts have to apply skills
mainly developed in managing state-to-state relations through
embassy-to-capital processes to navigating the different world of the
internal politics of the host country, down to the local level, as part
of nation-building. Development experts have to adjust to working
in non-secure COIN environments, and this adjustment involves
increased reliance on military forces for protection and support,
which cuts against the development-policy ethos of minimizing
military attachments. Mechanisms for integrating civilian and
military efforts in the manner required by COIN have not been
built and maintained over time, requiring the ad hoc creation of
these processes-a difficult task to execute well amidst the pressing
exigencies of conflict.
COIN thinking also requires a highly acute political sensibility
to the political, economic, and cultural realities of the host country
and its peoples. In its current manifestation, COIN doctrine does
not support the imposition of solutions by foreign
counterinsurgents on the host nation's government and
population. The objective is to facilitate that government and
population to develop their own governance capabilities to the
point that the country is self-sufficient against internal or external
threats. Foreign counterinsurgents have to build flexibility and
compromise into how they apply their own political principles and
material power. In this context, both civilian and military assets
become deeply intertwined with domestic politics, from the host
nation's capital down to the local level. The end result is the need
for foreign counterinsurgents to accept limits on the reach of their
political principles and the impact of their military power within
the host country-a difficult proposition to accept when foreign
counterinsurgent forces are expending blood and treasure in the
process.
The notion that COIN is an unusual form of armed conflict is
not really controversial. Rather, in the United States, disputes have
arisen whether (1) the U.S. government should engage in COIN
campaigns at all, and (2) the U.S. approach to COIN requires
radical adjustments in civilian and military terms to ensure that the
next COIN campaign fought by the United States avoids the
mistakes and problems experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
5258 [Vol. 37:5
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These perspectives reveal some level of consensus that the U.S.
performance in the Iraqi and Afghan COIN campaigns leaves
much to be desired. The bigger debate is essentially one over what
kind of relationship the United States should have with COIN as a
political-military endeavor. This question leads me to examine the
relationship between COIN and American exceptionalism.
III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
The controversy that erupted during the 2010 midterm
elections in the United States over American exceptionalism
revealed both how politically contentious and deeply held this idea
is.8 This concept has complex origins and divisive implications.9
The idea has its champions and its opponents both within and
beyond the United States. For some, American exceptionalism
connects to their belief in the hand of providence in the existence,
survival, and rise to global power of the United States. More
practical adherents of this idea compare what the United States has
to offer with less attractive alternatives connected with other great
powers, often warning people of the dangers of a weak United
States in world politics. Critics of this concept range from those
who believe it is a self-stitched fig leaf for the globalization of
American hypocrisy to those who find its hold on U.S. politicians
and foreign policy makers to be dangerous for the principles and
power of the United States itself.
For purposes of this essay, the idea of American
8. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, American Exceptionalism: An Old Idea and a New
Political Battle, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804139.html (describing the debate
in the 2010 midterm elections over whether American exceptionalism continues
to inform U.S. foreign policy objectives). Partisan politics over American
exceptionalism also arose in connection with President Obama's State of the
Union speech on January 25, 2011. See, e.g., Paul Glastris, American Exceptionalism
Repossessed, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com
/archives/individual/2011_01/027708.php (characterizing the 2011 State of the
Union address as an affirmation of Obama's belief in American exceptionalism).
9. See generally SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-
EDGED SWORD (1997); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998);
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Howard Zinn, The Power
and the Glory: Myths of American Exceptionalism, Bos. REV., Summer 2005, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/zinn.php (noting that Massachusetts Bay Colony
GovernorJohn Winthrop's statement in 1630 that the Colony shall be a "city upon
a hill" is generally considered the first manifestation of American exceptionalism);
ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS oF POWER: AN END TO AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
(2008).
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exceptionalism stands for the propositions that (1) the United
States is different from other nations because of the convergence of
our political principles and our material power, and (2) this
convergence gives us the right and responsibility to act
internationally to advance both our power and principles. In
essence, Americans believe that our political beliefs, and our duty
and abilities to act on those beliefs, are exceptional in world affairs.
Although this essay focuses on COIN, this belief in American
exceptionalism extends beyond the context of armed conflicts to
encompass many aspects of U.S. foreign policy behavior.
The roots of American exceptionalism are embedded in the
founding principles of the country-the self-evident truths of
human equality and the inherent rights of all to self-government,
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, American
exceptionalism did not have significance beyond the United States
until the country grew in economic and military power. Through
this power, U.S. leaders began to believe and act on the notion that
America's founding political ideals, with their universal potential,
could and should reach all corners of the earth. As President
Obama stated in 2009,
[W]e have a core set of values that are enshrined in our
Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic
practices, in our belief in free speech and equality, that,
though imperfect, are exceptional.... America has a
continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards
peace and prosperity and recognizing that leadership is
incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships
because we can't solve these problems alone.'
The emergence of American exceptionalism as an issue in the
2010 midterm elections has a number of sources, but the debate
mainly reflects growing concerns in the country about both its
principles and its power. The perception of many experts and
citizens that U.S. influence and power in international relations are
declining creates angst in the country about its domestic future and
role as world leader. Economically, the great domestic and global
recession that started in 2008 has shaken the nation's confidence in
its ability to achieve sustainable prosperity at home and play the
leading role in the global economy. The worsening fiscal
10. Press Release, The White House, News Conference by President Obama
at Strasbourg, France (Apr. 4, 2009), available at www.thewhitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009.
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conditions in state and federal governments have raised the
prospects of much leaner times ahead. Perhaps most sobering,
Americans realize that this unnecessary calamity started in the
United States with the collapse of the domestic subprime mortgage
markets and its destructive ripple effects in the U.S. and global
financial systems-hardly indicators of American exceptionalism in
the practice of economic principles and economic power.
Politically, the country's post-9/11 experiences in the "global
war on terrorism" have tested its faith in American exceptionalism,
given the U.S. government's resort to policies traditionally
associated with unexceptional regimes, such as enhanced
interrogation techniques, secret prisons overseas, controversial
foreign detention facilities, and the politically botched handling of
two post-invasion contexts overseas. Militarily, the American
people have seen history's most powerful military stymied and
bogged down, twice, in conflicts with shadowy insurgent forces
armed with militant religious beliefs, ruthless strategies and tactics,
and simple military technologies, such as AK-47s and improvised
explosive devices.
Concerns about direction of U.S. influence and power in the
second decade of the twenty-first century do not reveal
abandonment of American exceptionalism. Rather, these concerns
suggest the country is going through another episode of intense
reflection against a rather foreboding domestic and geopolitical
backdrop. For my purposes, the emergence of this period of
reflection about American exceptionalism during U.S. involvement
in two large-scale COIN campaigns is important in understanding
the U.S. relationship with COIN-past, present, and future.
IV. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
U.S. HISTORY
In the iconography of American exceptionalism, the wars that
resonate are monumental conflicts that directly, deeply, and
passionately engaged American principles and material power,
principally the American Revolution, World Wars I and II, and the
Cold War. U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies does not
feature among the commonly cited examples of American
exceptionalism in the conduct of armed conflict. At the risk of
simplifying complex historical events, the main reason for this
distance between American exceptionalism and U.S. participation
in counterinsurgencies is that such participation has not, generally
2011] 5261
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speaking, exhibited an effective convergence of American
principles and power.
In armed conflict, American exceptionalism has, in the past,
been associated with wars in which the United States remained
uncompromising on its principles and, ultimately, overpowering in
its application of military and economic power. As the earlier
description of COIN suggests, it is not the kind of armed conflict
that sits easily with the attributes associated with American
exceptionalism at war. U.S. struggles with COIN, past and present,
reflect more than inadequate training and misaligned capabilities;
these struggles indicate that, at a deeper level, the attributes of
American exceptionalism-the commitment to bedrock principles
and the possession of awe-inspiring power to advance them-do
not work well in COIN conflicts.
A. The Civil War and the Indian Wars
Although the language of COIN was not used to describe these
conflicts, the Civil War and the Indian wars of the nineteenth
century can be viewed as counterinsurgencies fought by the U.S.
government on its own soil. However, the manner in which the
U.S. government fought these conflicts, and their outcomes, bears
no resemblance to contemporary American COIN thinking, largely
because this thinking has exclusively focused on U.S. involvement
in foreign COIN operations. The Civil War was a total war, fought
by conventional armies, for the very survival of the Union. The
conflict's scale, intensity, and length signaled to other nations the
potential power the United States could marshal, especially if it
survived as a united country. However, the war's cause-the
continuation of slavery-highlighted an ugly, gaping hole in the
implementation of American ideals within its own body politic that
had to be filled with massive bloodshed. As President Lincoln said
in his Gettysburg Address, the war was about whether the American
proposition that all men are created equal and dedication to
government of, by, and for the people would endure or perish
from the earth.
The Indian wars of the nineteenth century pitted
outnumbered and outgunned indigenous peoples against surging
demographic, economic, and military forces unleashed to achieve
continental supremacy for the United States. Like the Civil War,
the Indian wars revealed more about the emerging material power
of the United States than it did about its principles of equality,
[Vol. 37:55262
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liberty, and self-government given the manner in which the U.S.
government treated the native inhabitants of the continent in its
march west.
B. The Philippines Campaign
At the time, U.S. involvement in fighting an insurgency in its
newly acquired possession of the Philippines at the end of the
nineteenth century was connected with a sense of American
exceptionalism. In 1898, President McKinley asserted that
American annexation of the Philippines would mean that Filipinos
"shall for ages hence bless the American republic because it
emancipated and redeemed their fatherland, and set them in the
pathway of the world's best civilization."" In 1899, U.S. Secretary of
War Elihu Root intertwined growing U.S. power internationally
with American ideals when he said "[t]he American soldier is
different from all other soldiers of all other countries since the
world began. ... [H]e is the advance guard of liberty and justice, of
law and order, and of peace and happiness.""
The U.S. COIN campaign in the Philippines has, however,
faded in importance for American exceptionalism because, despite
the rhetoric, the U.S. takeover of the Philippines reflected
imperialism from a nation that traditionally had been
philosophically, politically, and economically hostile to empires.
The U.S. arguments about emancipating and civilizing the peoples
of the Philippines were the same arguments most European
imperial powers used to justify their behavior. The rather brutal
means used to quell the insurgency also reflected more the
behavior of other imperial powers in their colonial domains than a
distinct, more principled American way of subduing an
insurgency.13 The takeaway messages from COIN in the Philippines
was the material power of the United States to impose its will on a
weaker foreign people and to signal to rival powers the continued
international expansion of U.S. interests and influence.
11. Quoted in Thomas Donnelly & Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in
Iraq: Lessons from the Philippines War, AM. ENTER. INST. OUTLOOK SERIES, Nov. 2003,
http://www.aei.org/outlook/19408.
12. Quoted in ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 167 (2002).
13. BRIAN M. LINN, THE PHILIPPINE WAR 1899-1902 327 (2000) ("[T]he
Philippine War proved to be a 'savage war of peace,' far more savage than many
Americans were willing to tolerate.").
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C. From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan
Although the United States engaged in other counter-
insurgencies and small wars between its experience in the
Philippines at the turn of the century and Vietnam in the 1960s,
these engagements never achieved anything close to the status of
World Wars I and II in the saga of American exceptionalism. These
global conflicts witnessed the United States melding its massive
economic and military power with efforts to reshape the nature of
domestic and international politics through application of
American principles. In both conflicts, it was American power that
eventually turned the tide of the wars, and it was American ideas
and leadership that dominated the post-war settlements.
However, the Vietnam war-the most important U.S. COIN
effort since the Philippines campaign-turned out to be a black eye
for American exceptionalism, not only because the United States
lost the war, but also because of how the United States lost it.
Despite, by this time, being a political, economic, and military
superpower, the United States did not produce an effective
integrated and coordinated political-military strategy to defeat the
Viet Cong insurgency and develop South Vietnam into a stable
democratic country. In Vietnam, neither U.S. power nor principles
prevailed, an outcome that cast long shadows on U.S. foreign
relations and domestic politics. This defeat encouraged civilian
and military components of the U.S. government to cast aside the
painful lessons from this failed COIN campaign under the
assumption that never again should the United States get
embroiled in this kind of conflict. Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger captured this mood in 1984 in enunciating the
"Weinberger Doctrine," which, among other things, emphasized
that when United States decides to use military force, it will do so
"wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning" -a
phrase that harkens back to the American experience in World
War II rather than the imbroglio of Vietnam.
From Vietnam until Iraq's descent into sectarian violence and
civil war, U.S. involvement in COIN was minimal and small-scale,
never registering with the resurgence of faith in American
14. Casper W. Weinberger, U.S. Sec'y of Defense, The Uses of Military Power,
Address Before the National Press Club, (Nov. 28, 1984), in AIRFORCE MAG., Jan.
2004, at 5, available at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive
/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keeperfull.pdf.
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exceptionalism in the 1980s. More prominent in this resurgence
was the shift to go on the offensive against the Soviet Union and its
allies, captured in President Reagan's strategy of rolling back Soviet
power by supporting anticommunist insurgencies around the world
and building up U.S. economic and military power beyond
anything the Soviet Union, with its decaying economy and political
system, could ever hope to match.
D. No COIN Thread in American Exceptionalism
This potted history of U.S. involvement in COIN makes, for
this essay's purposes, the simple point that the tradition of
American exceptionalism in armed conflict has no COIN strand in
it. This history provides no examples of the United States engaging
in COIN in ways that constitute an effective use of economic and
military power that reflect, spread, and sustain American principles
in other countries and cultures. The closest candidate-the
Philippines campaign-is a forgotten episode that, even in the
most favorable light, creates as much discomfort as pride
concerning U.S. behavior beyond its shores.
We cannot explain the lack of a COIN thread in the fabric of
American exceptionalism by observing that COIN has proved
difficult for all countries and regimes that have engaged seriously
in this endeavor. Although true, this observation is superficial
because it does not enlighten us about why the exceptional United
States, historically, has not handled the exceptional challenges of
COIN seemingly any better than other countries. This essay now
attempts to address this problem by examining the U.S. COIN
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan with a view to showing why the
characteristics of American exceptionalism prove a poor match for
the challenges COIN presents.
V. AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
A. Common Features
COIN experts caution that no two COIN campaigns are alike,
and, certainly, the U.S.-led counterinsurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan have unique features. However, the American
experiences in these countries exhibit some common features that
help illustrate why the United States has struggled with COIN over
the past decade. For starters, U.S. leaders never contemplated,
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even superficially, the need to engage in COIN in Iraq and
Afghanistan after the respective military invasions of these
countries. The United States only turned to COIN thinking in the
midst of worsening security and political crises in both nations.
COIN became the guiding strategy only on the cusp of massive
political and military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the
sacrifices and honorable service of civilian and military personnel
deployed in these theaters, this twice-played scenario is not one
that showcases American exceptionalism.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to turn to COIN
reflected the unwillingness or inability of the U.S. government to
integrate its post-invasion political and military objectives and
capabilities into a coherent strategy and effort. Shortly after
routing al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan towards the end
of 2001, the Bush administration essentially outsourced the task of
rebuilding Afghanistan as a modern democracy to multilateral
processes, especially NATO and the UN. This move was ironic
given the Bush administration's general lack of enthusiasm for
multilateral processes, particularly the UN. The administration
proceeded to starve the U.S. and multilateral effort in Afghanistan
from late 2002 and early 2003 onwards by diverting political
attention and military power towards Iraq. In short, the United
States did not even try American exceptionalism in Afghanistan
after its invasion. Not surprisingly, Afghanistan, over time, began
to disintegrate.
After the invasion of Iraq, the United States poured political
and military resources into the country, seeking to make it a
beacon of democracy in the Middle East-a goal dripping with the
can-do confidence associated with American exceptionalism. More
surprisingly, Iraq quickly began to disintegrate. The post-invasion
political and military strategies and tactics were disasters, which
reflected the failure of the Bush administration to think through
what is needed during an occupation to embed democratic
principles and politics in a foreign land while providing
population-wide security and stability. To use a Texas saying, the
Bush administration's approach to American exceptionalism was all
hat and no cattle.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, at the height of the crises, the
United States looked to an approach-COIN-it had, politically
and militarily, abandoned after the Vietnam war, which made the
double shift somewhat surreal. In other words, at these perilous
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moments, neither cherished U.S. political principles nor the
awesome power of the American military had any attachment to
COIN thinking, let alone any preparation and capabilities for
COIN. The move towards COIN meant the United States was twice
putting its faith in a strategy for which neither its civilian nor
military personnel were trained or resourced to undertake. This
very risky strategic swivel unleashed an extraordinary and, in some
respects, breathtaking U.S. effort to learn and execute COIN
thinking.
B. Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Iraq was ground zero of the troubled American embrace of
COIN strategy, so what happened with the U.S. application of
COIN principles in Iraq is of paramount importance in evaluating
the U.S. relationship with COIN. Perhaps fittingly, opinions differ
about the U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq. One perspective holds that
the COIN strategy worked, especially through the impact of the
surge of additional military forces and the change in how military
commanders used their soldiers to increase population security
rather than seek and destroy insurgent forces. Levels of violence in
Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, dropped significantly after full
deployment of the surge, creating increasingly more space for
intensified Iraqi-U.S. efforts to get the Iraqi government, security
forces, and political system functioning more effectively. In
addition, the political and military progress, even if not steady at all
times, proved sustainable, ultimately producing a climate in which
the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces became not only politically
desirable in both countries but also feasible in terms of on-the-
ground political and military conditions in Iraq.
A different interpretation acknowledges the importance of the
U.S. adoption of a COIN approach but cautions against giving too
much credit to the COIN strategy. First, although the military
surge played a role in bringing down violence, other developments
also contributed directly to this outcome, namely (1) the so-called
Sunni Awakening that involved Sunni leaders and tribal militias
turning against al Qaeda in Iraq and joining with American forces
to defeat it, and (2) the sometimes puzzling restraint by the
powerful anti-American Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in not using
his Mahdi Army against U.S. and Iraqi forces during critical periods
of the surge's buildup and implementation. In other words, the
U.S. COIN strategy benefited from a fortunate convergence of
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events rather than being the proximate cause of the reduction in
violence in Iraq.
Second, skeptics caution that, despite the progress made and
the ongoing reduction of the American military presence, Iraq
remains a troubled, fragile, and vulnerable country in the heart of
a very dangerous region of the world. In short, despite the
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, the endgame has yet to play out
in Iraq, and evaluations of the American COIN effort have to take
into account a longer period of time. Under this view, getting
lucky with COIN and crossing our fingers as we leave Iraq is hardly
cause for celebration of COIN strategy or the overall U.S.
performance in Iraq. Put another way, the United States is
supposed to be an exceptional nation, not a lucky one.
For my purposes, deciding which perspective is correct is not
necessary. The existence of these strongly held views raises serious
questions about whether the dramatic pivot into COIN operations
in Iraq represents an example of COIN-based American
exceptionalism. The invasion of Iraq appeared premised on faith
in the ability of the United States to use its military power to
remove an allegedly grave security threat and advance democratic
principles in a strategic country and region in a way that would
benefit world politics. However, the failure to find weapons of
mass destruction and the manner in which the ill-prepared, under-
resourced (especially in terms of military forces to secure post-
invasion Iraq), and badly conceived U.S.-led occupation descended
into sectarian violence, multiple insurgencies, and unnecessary
suffering among the Iraqi people mean that the invasion,
occupation, and COIN rescue are hard, collectively, to sustain as an
example of American exceptionalism. As with the imperial nature
of the U.S. COIN campaign in the Philippines and the "domino
theory"-inspired American involvement in Vietnam, COIN
campaigns cannot be evaluated in isolation from their larger
political and military contexts. As COIN thinking counsels, context
is critical.
This conclusion. does not preclude acknowledging the
extraordinary civilian and military efforts-from the commander in
chief down to the strategic corporal-that produced the U.S. COIN
campaign in Iraq under extremely trying, even desperate
circumstances. Against the advice of his commanders in Iraq,
President Bush ordered the military surge. Gen. David Petraeus
shepherded a new military doctrine on COIN into reality in
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unprecedented ways and at unprecedented speed. President Bush
tasked Gen. Petraeus to implement the strategy in Iraq and make
the surge work-which he did through the efforts of men and
women working in the Green Zone, patrolling the streets of Iraqi
cities, negotiating with tribal and community leaders in the
provinces, and fighting insurgents and terrorists wherever
necessary. American heroism lives even when U.S. policy falls short
of American exceptionalism.
With U.S. combat forces leaving Iraq, the COIN campaign is
essentially over, and the U.S. effort is transitioning to a
predominantly civilian endeavor, featuring deployment of
hundreds of additional civilian diplomats and development experts
to help keep Iraq on the path to stability. If successful, this phase
of U.S. involvement in Iraq could, in combination with the earlier
military surge, improve historical judgments about the U.S.
intervention in Iraq. Whether those judgments interpret long-term
success in Iraq as an example American exceptionalism remains to
be seen. Fortunately for Iraq and the United States, making that
connection is less important than the continuation of the Iraqi
transition from the abyss of civil war to a stable country.
C. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
Analyzing U.S. COIN efforts in Afghanistan against the
criterion of American exceptionalism is, perhaps paradoxically,
easier and harder than evaluating the Iraqi conflict. This task is
harder because the Afghan surge in civilian and military
capabilities is still relatively recent, which cautions against hasty
conclusions. Assessing the Afghan COIN campaign is, in some
ways, easier than Iraq because, as argued earlier, the United States
never really tried for years and years to harness its power and
principles in ways that would firmly set Afghanistan on a course for
a new stable, democratic, and prosperous future. In this respect,
the American experience in Afghanistan differs fundamentally
from what the United States attempted in Iraq.
As important, the U.S. move into COIN in Afghanistan, which
really only seriously happened when the Obama administration
took office in 2009, has been marked by deep controversies about
whether the United States is actually engaging in American-style
COIN in Afghanistan. The shift towards COIN came after the
Obama administration announced its first policy on Afghanistan in
spring 2009, and key elements of that policy involved a civilian
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uplift to get more civilian personnel working to stabilize
Afghanistan and utilization of the additional military troops
President Obama ordered early in his term be deployed to
Afghanistan. As is well known, controversies raged in the Obama
administration during the summer and fall of 2009 whether the
United States should pursue COIN (as applied in Iraq) or should
adopt another, more limited strategy, often dubbed
"counterterrorism plus."
In Obama's War, Bob Woodward recounts these controversies,
especially the fixation on how many more troops were needed in
Afghanistan (the power element) and exactly why they were
needed (the principles element) . Woodward's account portrayed
President Obama as attempting to find some middle ground
between the troop increases the military preferred to conduct
COIN more comprehensively and troop reductions called for by
the proponents of the "counterterrorism plus" strategy, chiefly Vice
President Biden. Amidst this debate, Obama administration
officials, perhaps realizing how bad things really were in
Afghanistan, began downplaying the scope of U.S. objectives,
increasingly stating that the United States was not engaging in
COIN in order to democracy-build or nation-build in
Afghanistan.' The scaling back of the substantive mission but the
scaling up of the civilian and military resources caused confusion
about what exactly the United States wanted to achieve in
Afghanistan and how it wanted to achieve it.
From a COIN perspective, this confusion generated many
questions. The extent to which foreign counterinsurgents have to
engage in nation-building depends on the level of governmental
capacity that exists in the host nation. With a country such as
Afghanistan, adopting a COIN approach without nation-building
did not make sense because decades of war and the Taliban regime
had effectively devastated governing capacity in Afghanistan. The
15. See generally BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA'S WAR (2010).
16. President Obama stated in February 2009 that the United States is "not
going to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy." Quoted in
Paul Koring, Democracy Fades from Obama's Afghan Agenda, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 4,
2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/article969789.ece.
17. Vice President Biden has indicated that he and President Obama agreed
that "the COIN strategy was not appropriate for signing on indefinitely to a nation-
building campaign." Quoted in Marc Ambinder, Biden, on the Afghanistan Debate, in
His Own Words, THE ATANTIc, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2010/08/biden-on-the-afghanistan-debate-in-his-own-
words/60868/.
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years wasted between the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the
start of the Obama administration meant that, under COIN
thinking, counterinsurgents in Afghanistan would have to engage
in serious nation-building activities in order to have a functioning
host government with which to partner. But, according to the
administration, the United States was not conducting nation-
building in Afghanistan. So, what exactly were all the additional
civilian and military personnel going to be doing?
The Obama administration's policy process generated another
confusing issue from a COIN perspective. President Obama made
clear to his civilian and military subordinates that he would not
support comprehensive COIN in Afghanistan. This position
appeared to affect development of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's
proposed strategy, released in the fall of 2009, which envisioned a
modified COIN campaign that focused resources on protecting
"critical high-populations areas" (e.g., cities and towns) in
18Afghanistan. Although understandable, given the views of the
Commander in Chief, leaving the majority of the Afghan
population that lived in rural areas outside this strategy left many
COIN experts scratching their heads. How would the U.S. and
Afghan governments win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
population through a strategy that left most of the population
beyond the heightened security the strategy promised to create?
This question had a sharper edge when viewed in the context
of the problems the United States was having with Afghan
insurgents using Pakistan as a base of operations for launching
attacks in Afghanistan. COIN doctrine holds that securing borders
from insurgent infiltration is critical, and the Obama
administration's AfPak approach recognized that the problems in
Afghanistan were linked with problems in Pakistan. U.S. attempts
to get Pakistan to deal with this problem proved, however,
frustrating, with only partial progress made. The highest profile
success story involved the use of drone aircraft for targeting and
killing Taliban and al Qaeda leaders located in Pakistan's border
region with Afghanistan.
From a COIN perspective, however, failure to secure the
border areas effectively and protect the .population from attacks
launched from Pakistan meant that the drone campaign was not as
18. GENERAL STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL, COMISAF's INITIAL ASSESSMENT, 2-20
(Aug. 30, 2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/AssessmentRedacted_092109.pdf.
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significant as people claimed or wanted to believe. COIN is not
about counting the number of insurgents killed or wounded by
military operations; it is about protecting the population of the
host nation from attack and helping that population move towards
self-sufficiency in security, governance, and economic capability.
But, the United States was increasing drone strikes in Pakistan,
pulling back from protecting the Afghan population living in rural
areas, and asserting it was not engaging in nation-building in
Afghanistan.
More examples could be provided, but those described above
raise the question whether the United States was engaging in COIN
in Afghanistan as COIN was envisioned in the leading strategies
that informed the Iraqi campaign. COIN thinking is not
monolithic; it is acutely aware of the need to adjust to differences
on the ground in specific circumstances. However, the examples
above connect to some core COIN principles, which make the
examples problematical for asserting without hesitation that the
U.S. approach in Afghanistan actually reflects COIN theory and
practice. Thus, on this line of enquiry, assessing COIN in
Afghanistan against the criterion of American exceptionalism
constitutes a rather misguided endeavor because we are not
entirely sure COIN is the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
The counterargument is that the administration's strategy
contains sufficient elements that link with COIN concepts to make
the strategy COIN-worthy. Taking this approach creates, however,
difficulties with seeing American exceptionalism in the COIN
approach being utilized. As mentioned above, one theme in the
evolution of the Obama administration's Afghan strategy has been
the consistent ratcheting down of expectations about what the
United States can achieve in Afghanistan. This trajectory includes
not only the assertions that the United States is not engaging in
nation-building but also indications that the Obama administration
no longer expects to leave behind a functioning democracy
committed to the rule of law.'9
Thus, the application of increased U.S. material power-the
civilian and military surges-will support more minimal policy
19. Quil Lawrence, For Obama, A Mixed Report Card from Afghanistan, NPR,
Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/10/131967485/for-obama-a-mixed-
report-card-from-afghanistan ("It is not lost on Afghans that Washington isn't
talking much about democracy-building, women's rights or combating
Afghanistan's leviathan illegal narcotics trade.").
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goals that do not, at all, accord with the role of American principles
in American exceptionalism. So, even if the United States is
performing COIN in Afghanistan, it is not doing so in a manner
that reflects American exceptionalism. To many both in and
outside the United States, what is happening in Afghanistan reflects
ever more transparently a search for the best available, most
politically expedient exit strategy.
VI. THE RULE OF LAw IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
Looking more closely at the rule of law in COIN thinking and
recent U.S. experiences helps illuminate the gap between
American exceptionalism, as an idea, and the realities of COIN as
practiced in Iraq and Afghanistan. In American political thinking,
the rule of law is a philosophy of governance central to self-
government and the exercise of individual liberty. This philosophy
travels with the United States in its foreign policy activities with the
rest of the world, and it forms a central part of what American
exceptionalism means.
In COIN doctrine and thinking developed to guide the United
States, the rule of law is similarly a critical objective. Each strand of
effort made by counterinsurgents-security, governance,
humanitarian assistance, providing basic services, and economic
development-requires legal rules, processes, and institutions that
ensure that the rule of law, not the rule of men, prevails in
rebuilding or strengthening the host nation. COIN doctrine
emphasizes, for example, that the rule of law "is a powerful tool for
counterinsurgents" and that security-the linchpin of the entire
effort-"under the rule of law is essential., 20
Given the stature of the rule of law within American
exceptionalism and COIN thinking, how the rule of law has fared
in the COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan provides a
barometer for the relationship between American exceptionalism
and COIN. In keeping with the general American belief in the rule
of law and the COIN doctrine's emphasis on the rule of law, the
U.S. COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have included rule-
of-law components, sometimes called "rule-of-law operations."
However, these operations have sparked controversies about the
meaning of the rule of law, revealed a serious lack of rule-of-law
capabilities in the U.S. government, and produced generally poor
20. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39, 42.
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results. These problems have produced a scaling back of rule-of-
law ambitions, especially in Afghanistan, which raises questions
about the U.S. commitment to the rule of law and the COIN
doctrine's emphasis on the rule of law.
Initial post-invasion plans for Iraq and Afghanistan included
rule-of-law components, but efforts to advance the rule of law ran
into multiple difficulties. In Iraq, military and civilian lawyers
tasked with working on the rule of law were often deployed with no
background in Iraqi law, the civil law system that formed the basis
of Iraqi law or Islamic law. They also often did not have Arabic
language abilities or translated copies of Iraqi laws. Legal
challenges military lawyers had prepared to handle-an expected
humanitarian crisis resulting from the invasion-did not occur,
and no one had prepared civilian or military legal experts for the
possibility of engaging in COIN-centric rule-of-law activities. The
worsening security situation made it difficult for work with Iraqi
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers to proceed, which eventually
shifted attention to securing courthouses, protecting key Iraqi legal
personnel, and prosecuting high-value insurgents and their
supporters-epitomized by the establishment of the fortified Iraqi
Central Criminal Court.
Efforts to improve the rule of law in Iraq also suffered from
U.S. actions, most notoriously the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction (which undermined the main international legal
justification for the invasion), the failure to secure Iraq after the
invasion in keeping with its international legal obligations as an
occupying power, the abuse U.S. military personnel meted out to
Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison, the imperious behavior of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (e.g., the disastrous disbanding
of the Iraqi armed forces), and the perception that U.S. security
contractors (e.g., Blackwater) operated in Iraq without
accountability under Iraqi or U.S. law. As Iraq descended into
sectarian violence and civil war, the rule of law as an objective
became increasingly marginalized in the struggle to reestablish
security in Iraq.
None of the accepted explanations concerning the COIN-led
21. The first serious effort to prepare guidance for military lawyers working
on rule-of-law operations in Iraq and Afghanistan appeared in 2007. See CTR. FOR
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS & JOINT FORCE JUDGE ADvOCATE, RULE OF LAW
HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 1 (2007),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/rule-of-law_07-2007.pdf.
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turnaround in the security situation hinge on the achievement of
rule-of-law improvements in Iraq. In fact, the U.S. military's
embrace of the Sunni Awakening raised concerns that partnering
with militia groups would undermine a key tenet of the rule of
law-that the state "monopolizes the use of force in the resolution
of disputes[.]"" The military surge and cooperation with
disaffected Sunni tribes helped bring more security back to Iraq,
but whether it was security under the rule of law as envisioned in
COIN doctrine was questionable.
The problems experienced in rule-of-law operations in Iraq
raised conceptual controversies about what the rule of law should
mean in contexts such as Iraq. In these environments, should
foreign counterinsurgents opt for a minimalist vision of the rule of
law, which focuses on the existence and operation of stable legal
institutions (e.g., courts, police, and prisons) but does not insist
that the laws and practices applied follow any particular substantive
content? Or, should the rule of law be more expansive, meaning
that the content of laws and the behavior of legal institutions have
to reflect key political principles, such as democracy, separation of
church and state, equality of men and women, and the protection
of fundamental human rights?
This debate reflected doubt about the ability of U.S.
counterinsurgent efforts to deliver the type of substantive rule of
law traditionally associated with American exceptionalism. It also
highlighted the messiness of COIN, especially the need for
counterinsurgents to be flexible in light of local circumstances and
compromise politically and culturally to produce a workable way
forward. However, this calculating approach contrasts with the
rule-of-law behavior of the United States in the great events of
American exceptionalism, particularly the successful imposition of
democracy and human rights on the defeated German and
22. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., U.S. ARMY & CTR.
FOR L. AND MIL. OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAw HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR
JUDGE ADvocATEs 7 (2009), http://www.1oc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/rule-of-
law_2009.pdf.
23. For discussion on the scope of the meaning of the rule of law in the
context of military interventions, see JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN, & ROSA
BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAw AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONs 56-84 (2006).
24. Sarah Sewall, "A Radical Field Manual," in COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD
MANUAL, supra note 1, at xxxix ("[The counterinsurgency Field Manual] asks
Americans to define their aims in the world and accept the compromises they
require. COIN will not effectively support a revolutionary grand strategy.").
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Japanese nations after World War II and the triumph of the
American version of the rule of law in the Cold War.
In Afghanistan, the multilateral efforts to reconstitute the
Afghan government after the toppling of the Taliban regime in
2001 involved dividing responsibilities among the participating
countries, and Italy was assigned the task of improving the Afghan
justice system, which decades of war and Taliban rule had
devastated. By the time the United States turns to COIN thinking
in 2009 to rescue the situation in Afghanistan, the Afghan justice
system was still in shambles in just about every respect, especially in
the pervasiveness of corruption that had, by this time, penetrated
every aspect of Afghan governance. Efforts by the Italians, the
Americans, the UN, and others had made little, if any, sustainable
progress in the years after the defeat of the Taliban. Positive-
impact rule-of-law activities during this period, and in the wake of
the civilian uplift that started in 2009, could be considered tactical
successes, but, as COIN thinking stresses, tactical wins do not
necessarily add up to strategic progress in the overall campaign.
As COIN emerged in Afghan policy, experts identified the lack
of faith of the Afghan people in the formal justice system as one
reason why they sometimes tolerated the return of the Taliban,
who would institute swift justice in areas under their control. In
addition, rule-of-law efforts began to try to understand the
predominant use of informal justice mechanisms in Afghanistan's
rural areas-mechanisms entrenched in these communities that,
despite their attributes, are far from the U.S. conception of the rule
of law in how these mechanisms operate. The search for ways to
coordinate improvements to the formal Afghan justice system with
the informal justice system represented a COIN-influenced move to
a more minimalist rule-of-law strategy-that is, create stable
institutions that will survive U.S. withdrawal and the likely ongoing
weaknesses of the Afghan central government.
Setting the rule-of-law bar lower is consistent with the general
lowering of expectations underway in the Obama administration
concerning U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Building the rule of
law, as reflected in the idea of American exceptionalism, is difficult
when the United States is not (1) engaged in nation-building in
Afghanistan-a country effectively without a functioning justice
system-and (2) attempting to protect the population in rural
areas through better security, which ensures formal Afghan justice
institutions will not be able to take root and operate safely where
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most Afghan people live.
This overview of rule-of-law efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
does not capture the full texture of these activities and the sincerity
and skill with which they have been undertaken. However,
American exceptionalisin has always been about more than
American intentions; it is a claim about the ability to deliver on
advancing political principles, such as the rule of law, in other
countries and regions of the world. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we
have more questions than answers about the relationship of the
rule of law and COIN. In particular, we might wonder, as some
COIN practitioners have, whether the emphasis placed on the rule
of law in COIN is realistic or, rather, reflects political correctness in
American COIN thinking that deserves reevaluation in light of the
Iraqi and Afghan experiences. Such a reevaluation would,
however, call into question whether COIN and American
exceptionalism are compatible.
VII. THE UNITED STATES AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE FUTURE
One of the questions hanging over the U.S. involvement in
COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is whether, after these
experiences, the United States will repeat its post-Vietnam aversion
to preparing for and participating in this kind of armed conflict.
At the moment, with Iraq, at least in some circles, considered a
qualified COIN success and with Afghanistan not yet in the
endgame, predicting the future U.S. relationship with COIN is
difficult. My sense is that neither the civilian nor military
components of the U.S. government will rapidly abandon COIN
thinking after these two conflicts are effectively for history to pick
over. The commitment the United States has made to COIN in the
first decade of the twenty-first century goes far beyond anything
tried in the Vietnam War, which means COIN doctrine and lessons
learned will survive longer in civilian and military establishments.
This COIN echo from Iraq and Afghanistan does not mean,
however, that the United States will engage in large-scale COIN
again for a long time. More likely, the United States will make
every effort to avoid the mistakes that led it into COIN in Iraq and
Afghanistan. For the foreseeable future, mounting constraints on
U.S. power, particularly the anemic economic recovery and the
massive fiscal crisis, will curtail the willingness and ability of the
United States to entertain foreign interventions of any significant
scale. As a result, the practical application of COIN thinking
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developed in Iraq and Afghanistan will probably come in advising
foreign governments struggling with incipient or actual
insurgencies rather than in engaging in COIN with massive U.S.
military and civilian footprints in foreign countries. The United
States has long engaged in such advising roles, as illustrated by the
assistance the United States has provided Colombia in its COIN
campaign against rebel forces.
In these circumstances, indirect participation in small wars will
probably not rouse American exceptionalism significantly as a
domestic or foreign policy factor. In that sense, COIN and
American exceptionalism will part company, an outcome
supported by the historical failures of the United States to conduct
COIN campaigns in ways that reflect the claims of American
exceptionalism. Barring some unexpected existential threat to the
United States that requires a COIN response, the trajectory will be
for COIN thinking to fade in civilian and military circles, with
aspects of COIN doctrine and insights translated into other
operational contexts, such as civilian and military involvement in
preventive diplomacy, counterterrorism, conflict prevention and
resolution, post-conflict development work, and humanitarian
disaster response.
At the heart of U.S. troubles with direct civilian and military
American participation in COIN is a disconnect between what
COIN requires and how the United States traditionally perceives
American exceptionalism at war-establishment of American-
inspired universal political principles through the application of
overwhelming American military and economic power. We have
struggled at COIN not because it is difficult (the Cold War was
difficult) and not because we were unprepared for COIN (America
was not prepared for World War II). Rather, the nature of COIN
forces the United States to think and act on its principles and
power very differently than we did in the iconic conflicts that help
define the belief in American exceptionalism. Our travails in Iraq
and Afghanistan require us to think not only more deeply about
COIN as a form of armed conflict but also about American
exceptionalism in twenty-first century warfare.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The assertion that the United States has not been able to align
its principles and its power in waging COIN in Iraq and
Afghanistan in a way that supports the claim of American
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exceptionalism might anger adherents and critics of this belief.
Critics will dismiss this analysis on the premise that American
exceptionalism is a delusional myth that American actions in Iraq
and Afghanistan expose as pervasive and pernicious. Those who
defend American exceptionalism might construe my argument as an
attack on the men and women who have shouldered the dangerous
burdens of COIN in serving their country. Neither criticism hits the
mark.
My analysis takes the claim of American exceptionalism
seriously and analyzes why U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have not reflected what this belief maintains about the principles
and power of the United States. More deeply, the analysis raises
troubling questions about whether the exceptional nature of COIN
as a form of armed conflict involves the worst possible context in
which to try to demonstrate American exceptionalism. These
questions are important as the United States evaluates what it has
learned from the Iraqi and Afghan experiences, and they go deeper
into American interests and values than more generic conclusions
that these experiences teach us how hard COIN is and how badly
prepared we were, twice, to wage this form of armed conflict.
The image often associated with American exceptionalism is the
city upon a hill, or, in Ronald Reagan's formulation, the shining city
on a hill-a beacon of peace, prosperity, and hope crafted through
the ingenuity of self-government and individual liberty. The image
often associated with COIN in the American mind is quagmire-a
precarious context that swallows blood and treasure without signs of
progress. To engage in COIN, Americans have to leave the city on a
hill-get outside the wire in COIN terms-and operate in
environments that have, historically, been unforgiving to fusing
American principles and power effectively in foreign lands. Iraq and
Afghanistan teach the same lesson in different ways.
In the future, the United States might be expected, tempted, or
forced to go outside the wire again, and the United States will need
more clarity of purpose and skill in applying power than it has
exhibited in past COIN campaigns. We know enough to understand
that pledging allegiance to American exceptionalism is not sufficient
to handle the challenges of COIN. What we have not yet figured out
is how to prevail in COIN in ways that support the belief that
American principles and power are, when effectively combined,
something to behold.
52792011]
